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Comment

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS:
TERRITORIALISM IN THE WAKE OF
THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET
CRASH

The notion of independence is always associated with the existence
of a State, yet there are very few States in the world of which it is
possible to say that they are absolutely independent of every other
State whatever, nor even politically independent of every other
State. States are bound to one another partly by treaties, and partly
by duties that lie upon them, and control their freedom of action.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The increased globalization of securities markets requires a close
look at current models of extraterritorial application of securities
regulations. 2 Recognizing that there is essentially only one market, a
"world market," this comment examines the inter-relationship of

1. Aios, LECTuREs ON INTmEATiONA. LAw 34 (1983).
2. Although the various major markets are increasingly interdependent, they also retain
individuality to a great extent in regulation. Integration of the regulation of major markets
has been resisted. U.S. SEcunnrms AND ExcHANaE Col .sON, No. 1271, THE OCroBER 1987
MARHET BREAx (1988) at 11-1 [hereinafter THE OCTOBER 1987 MAxEr Ba1RAx].
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major markets, 3 the ultimate necessity of cooperative regulation, and

the establishment of principles of cooperative application of jurisdiction as an intermediate step toward that goal.
This comment will address the limits to extraterritorial application

of securities regulations by the United States. These limitations
include recognized principles of international law, the practical likelihood of effective enforcement, and constraints imposed by the 1934

Securities Exchange Act. 4 This comment will then analyze jurisdictional models currently applied by U.S. courts. The objective of this
comment is to (1) evaluate and determine the extent that United
States courts can apply these tests to current conditions in the global

securities market, and (2) to propose a model for the extraterritorial
application of securities regulations which will provide protection for
the inter-linked world economies while protecting territorial independence.
II.

TE NEED FOR CooPERATIvE REGULATiON: A LooK AT TmE
OCTOBER

1987 MARKET BREAK

The crash of the New York Stock Exchange on October 19, 1987

has been described as a "global crash." '5 The ripple effects of the

crah impacted the markets in London, West Germany, and Japan. 6

The global effect of this event should make the necessity for international cooperative regulation clear. No doubt these events enhance
the worries of major market regulators. Indeed, even prior to the

3. Over the last decade the various securities markets around the world have become
increasingly integrated psychologically and through improved communications technology.
Regulatory barriers to investment in foreign markets are continually being decreased as investors
look more to the world markets for alternative investment opportunities and as vehicles to
adjust investment risk exposure. A time sequence analysis of the price movements in the
Tokyo, London, and U.S. markets before and after the October market break clearly illustrates
the linkage of these markets. By Friday, October 16, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Index
declined by 9.6% from the opening on Monday, October 12. The Tokyo market reacted
quickly creating heavy sell pressure on October 19 forcing the market down throughout the
day closing down 2.3%. Trading then opened in London down 7.8% from the previous week
and declined steadily throughout most of the day. After a brief afternoon rally, London closed
down 12.6% at the close of October 19 trading. The U.S. market followed with a pre-open
downturn of 10.9% from the previous Friday. When Tokyo opened the next day, 95% of the
stocks were unable to open because of a sell-side order imbalance. The Nikkei Dow Jones
Industrial Index (an index of 225 leading TKE stocks) fell 7.5% during the morning with a
steady decrease during the day for a total drop of 14.7% for the day. THE OcroBnR 1987
MARKET BRA, supra note 2, at 11-1, 11-5, 11-6.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1933).
5. After the Meltdown of '87, NEwswnna, November 2, 1987, at 14.
6. Id. See also TE OcTonan 1987 MARKET BREAK, supra note 2, at 11-1 - 11-20
(discussing the interdependence of international securities markets).
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October 19, 1987 market break, financial regulators in London and
the United States recognized new risks and greater potential for
damage stemming from increased market interdependence, prompting
a concern that market regulators move toward common standards of
regulation2 The crash merely emphasized the reality, then and now,
of the need for shared responsibility in the regulation of world
markets, at least on the basic rules covering insider trading, fraud,
and uniform registration and disclosure requirements,8 in order to
prevent world-wide catastrophe.
An example of the need for cooperative regulation can be seen
with the following hypothetical. Assume that a Japanese Investor
(Investor) who owns substantial shares in Euromax, a corporation
formed in Great Britain listing its securities on the London, Tokyo
and New York stock exchanges, has information that Euromax is
about to lose a highly lucrative contract that will force the stock
price down substantially. Investor instructs his investment advisor to
sell all his shares on the Tokyo Market. This in turn forces the price
lower when trading opens in London and New York. British and
American investors in Euromax could incur substantial losses because
of the dramatic price failure. The question is where jurisdiction
would be proper for the British and/or American investors (or the
Securities and Exchange Commission) to bring an action against
Investor on an insider trading claim. Cooperative regulation is necessary in protecting the interests of foreign and domestic investors
and in safeguarding the integrity of the world securities markets.
Inasmuch as complete cooperative regulation may be a long term
goal requiring a long period of transition, more immediate measures
should be considered which resolve current problems and point in

7. A Special Report, Global Finance & Investing, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1987, at D16D17.
8. As an example of cooperative regulation, the SEC has recently reached an agreement
with the London Stock Exchange concerning SEC Rule 10b-6 which prohibits purchases and
inducements to purchase during a "cooling off period" preceding distribution. SEC Rule 10b6, reprinted in, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (Supp. 1987). This period ranges from two -to nine
business days prior to the offer for sale. Since the broker-dealer schematics are different in

the U.S. and U.K., lOb-6 restrictions effectively create a barrier to foreign corporations and
affiliates who distribute in the U.S. Traditionally, the SEC's view was that the 10b-6 restrictions
applied to syndicates outside the U.S. as well as U.S. affiliated purchasers. The SEC's rationale

was that prices of securities outside the U.S. affect the prices of their affiliated securities
within the U.S. In the accommodation reached between the SEC and the London Stock
Exchange, the SEC has agreed to waive some of the 10b-6 restrictions, particularly where
passive market making is involved. Bartos, London Stock Fxchange-SEC Agreement on
Market Making, INT'L. Far. L. REv. 32 (Jan. 1988).
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the direction of cooperative regulation. 9 Past experience in extrater-

ritorial application of antitrust regulation has shown that arbitrary
imposition of United States standards is not the answer.' 0 As the
U.S. increasingly exerts jurisdiction to enforce, extraterritorially, its
domestic laws, accusations surface that the U.S. is attempting to
unilaterally impose its self designed solution to a multinational prob-

lem. The international reaction is defensive, interpreting extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction as intrusive and overbearing.
9. One example of cooperative regulation is the recent SEC proposal which attempts to
harmonize minimum disclosure requirements for simultaneous multinational offerings in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The proposal introduces two approaches to
harmonization: commonality and reciprocity. Under the commonality approach, each participating country would agree to one common disclosure instrument which would be filed in
each jurisdiction. Under the reciprocity approach, each country would agree to minimum
disclosure requirements. Each country would then have independent authority to review required
offering documents upon filing in that jurisdiction. The SEC acknowledges that the reciprocal
approach would be much easier to implement than would be the commonality approach.
Merloe, Internationalization of Securities Markets: A Critical Survey of U.S. and EEC
Disclosure Requirements, 8 J. Comtp. Bus. & CAP. MxT. L. 249, 264-65 (1986).
An example of such cooperative regulation might be considered in the areas of automated
trading. In conducting its post-market break analysis the SEC used the NYSE audit trail to
identify the most active broker/dealers. Those firms provided information of various activities
including order routing mechanisms and international trading. That analysis revealed the heavy
consequences of program trading, particularly in "portfolio insurance" management. Portfolio
insurance refers to a variety of hedging strategies to control market risk based on disciplined
buying and selling, triggered by pre-set parameters relating to specific market indicators.
Typically, these transactions provide little or no warning to trading specialists or other market
participants of the amount of potential selling activity it represents. The dangers of program
trading are intensified since this practice is often used by institutional traders with large blocks
of securities.
The SEC post-break analysis revealed that on October 19 institutional investors traded
slightly over 50% of the total market activity on the NYSE for the day. One major pension
fund sold 27.3 million shares supplemented by an additional sale, on the 16th and 19th, of
7,000 "SPZ" contracts-equivalent to approximately 17.6 million shares with a dollar value
of $705 million. The latter sale was accomplished through thirteen programs to sell blocks of
2 million shares each. Information from the International Stock Exchange of the United
Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, Ltd. (ISE) indicates that there may have been a number
of transactions stemming from program trading executed on that market as well. Since the
ISE does not require that all traders in foreign stocks be reported, complete information has
not yet been available. See TaE OcoBR 1987 MLAXRET BREAx, supra note 2, at 1-2, 1-15, 22, 2-8, 2-15, 11-2.
Subsequent to October 19, the SEC has been rumored to show an escalated interest in
regulation of program trading in light of these and other high impact problems. This may
very well provide the SEC with a perfect opportunity to investigate the possibility of shared
regulation of program trading on the international markets.
10. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
11. Grundman, The New Imperialism: The ExtraterritorialApplication of United States
Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 259 (1980). In conducting an analysis of jurisdictional reach, some
authors have alluded that the problem lies not in the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction,
but in the perception of foreign governments. It has been argued that some foreign countries
fail to perceive the benefits of internationalization, preferring protectionism by enacting laws
and adopting practices that discourage foreign investment. The problem, however, appears to
be multilateral requiring concerted attentioi. See generally Charter & Beck, Problems of
Enforcement in the MultinationalSecurities Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 467 (1987).
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As the first step towards cooperative regulation, principles of
jurisdiction to prescribe domestic regulations with extraterritorial
application or effect should be clearly defined. Clarity may diminish
claims of intrusive and over-reaching jurisdiction. First, regulations
governing investment should insure neutrality, 12 predictability, 13 and
consistency 4 in the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign initiated
transactions. Second, accepted principles of sovereignty require extraterritorial application of laws to be minimally intrusive, with clear
justification for the application and enforcement of regulations that
exceed the limitations of customary principles of international law. 5
Finally, maintenance of equality in the mutual protection of respective
interests is also critical.16 Major market regulators must take steps
now to insure a solid, consistent, and predictable model for the
extraterritorial application of securities regulations. Cooperation in
regulating world markets may follow.
III.

INTERNAT ONAL LAW AS A LMnuT TO JuRisDIcTIoN TO

PRESCRBE
Customary international law requires a panoramic view of independent sovereign interests whenever efforts are made to stabilize or
regulate integrated international intterests.17 In the traditional sense,
jurisdiction is the distribution of authority,' based on territorial
independence. 9 Sovereignty of State implies the right of a State to
exercise jurisdiction within its own territory. 2 Such jurisdiction is
necessarily exclusive, absolute, and susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself. 2' Thus, everything within the territory of a State
is subject to complete control by domestic law. 2
Early territorialists held that borders were finite and the application
of a state's law could reach no further than those borders. 23 The

12.
13.
14.
15.

FArx, THE RoE or DomisTic CouTra w THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 22 (1964).
Amos, supranote 1, at 22; Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32 n.2.
Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30-31; See also notes 82 to 87 and accompanying text.
FALr, supra note 12, at 25; Amos, supra note 1, at 38-39; Hr.oRacn, MoDm

INTERNATIONAL LAW

15 (1984).

16. Amos, supra note 1, at 50.
17. Charter & Beck, supra note 11, at 469.
18. FArK, supra note 12, at 21.
19. Id.
20. HwaoRAm, supra note 15, at 120.
21. FA ,, supra note 12, at 29 (citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)).
22. Id.
23. Comelis van Bynkershoek, an 18th century Dutch jurist, published several books

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 1
rule was clear, simple, and could be applied universally. However,
the rule was not without shortcomings. This rigid view created an
"immunity umbrella" for those who could act abroad to achieve

illegal domestic objectives.2 To counter such a restrictive view this
rule induced an expansion of the authority to assert control over
5
events with only a remote spatial contact with the claimant state.2
Notwithstanding these problems, in the United States this territorialist view was consistently applied and acknowledged by the U.S.

Supreme Court. In 1909 the U.S. Supreme Court held in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 26 that jurisdiction would not lie
where a New Jersey corporation tortiously injured an Alabama
corporation on foreign soil. 27 The Court expressed the "almost uni-

versal rule" that since all legislation is prima facie territorial, the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful can only be determined by
the law of the country where the act is done.2

Significantly, Banana Co. rdcognized that comity between nations
is an important goal. The plaintiffs argued that the value placed on

the principles of comity cannot be extended so far as to "cloak a

'29
violation of the laws of the nation whose comity is appealed to."

concerning "positivist" theories of international law. Those publications, such as De domino
marls dissertatio-Dominionof the Seas and Quaestionum Juris Publice Libri Duo-Questions
of Public Law, supported early territorialism. Bynkershoek was the founder of the three mile
rule of territorial waters initially based upon the range of a cannon shot. Hm]owi, supra
note 15, at 18-19.
24. FAK, supra note 12, at 31.
25. Id.
26. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
27. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In Banana Co., the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by wrongfully persuading the Costa Rican government to seize a railroad under construction and banana
plantations (located in Panama) owned by plaintiff. Id. at 354-55. The primary concern of
the Court was that the acts alleged completely took place on foreign soil-no conduct occurred
within United States territory. Id. at 357. The Court held that there was no jurisdiction over
extraterritorial acts, even where both parties were United States corporations. Id. at 357-58.
28. Id. at 357. The Court concluded that it should construe, as a matter of course, generic
legislative phrases to apply only to persons subject to the legislation, not to everyone over
whom the legislator could gain control. In the case of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
improbability of the United States attempting to regulate conduct on foreign soil is obvious.
In the Court's view, it was entirely plain that the defendant's foreign activities were not within
the scope of United States antitrust laws. Id.
The idea that legislation is prima facie territorial is not new, nor is it solely an American
concept. In Exparte Blain, decided in 1879, the Chancery Division of the English High Court
of Justice declined jurisdiction over a bankruptcy action because the members of a firm doing
business in Liverpool were domiciled in Chili and had never been to England. Ex parte Blain,
12 Ch. Div'l. Ct. 522, 528 (1879).
29. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 349 (citing The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.)
283, 354 (1822); The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 152, 169 (1821); The Marianna Flora,
24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826); The Merino. The Constitution. The Louisa., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
391, 405 (1824)).
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The plaintiffs believed that illegality was being protected under the
guise of national comity. However, the court, in holding for the
defendants, did not intend to protect illegality with principles of
comity. Rather, the Court noted that for a jurisdiction to treat a
party according to domestic law instead of the law of the place where
the act was committed not only would be unjust, but would be an
interference with the authority of the other sovereign, and would
result in justifiable resentment. 0
Other commentators, less concerned with formal territorial boundaries, have seen comity as an obligation among states3 1 to recognize
and respect the relevant interests of foreign nations. 32 The view of
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
33
propounded by the American Law Institute, concerning comity,
(sometimes considered to incorporate a requirement of reciprocity),
is that comity is not merely discretionary, but obligatory. 34 "The
obligation, however, is not necessarily dependent upon any finding
that another state would exercise jurisdiction in the same manner or
to the same extent." 35 Reciprocity is, however, relevant to the extent
of evaluation of other Restatement factors applied in making a
determination of proper jurisdiction. 6
Thus, the maturation of principles of international law-principles
that are both disciplined and flexible-impose limits on the power
of a sovereign to apply its domestic laws extraterritorially.
IV. PRAcTicAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ExTRATERmomL
ENFORCEMENT OF SEC REGULATIONS

Assuming for the moment that regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) fit into.the framework of acceptable
international rules for extraterritorial application of domestic law,
an assessment of the ability of the SEC to gain assistance from
foreign regulatory agencies in investigating and enforcing U.S. regulations is equally important. Three areas of difficulty impede the

30.

Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356 (citing Phillips v. Eyre, [1870] 6 Q.B. 1, 28).

31. RESTATEmENT
vimn) ozrFoRmoi
RELATiONS LAW op THE UNrD STATEs
reporter's notes 8-9 (Tent. Draft No. 7 1986) [hereinafter PRSTATEMENT (REVED)].

§ 403

32. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1959). See
also REsTATE EwT (REvisED), supra note 31, § 403 reporter's comments 8-9.
33. REsTATEmENT (REvSED), supra note 31, § 403 reporter's comments 8-9.
34. Id. § 403 comment a.

35. Id.
36. Id. See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text (discussion of factors relevant to
determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable).

I
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enforcement of U.S. securities laws abroad. First, philosophical differences with respect to certain activity limits the sense of urgency
by foreign agencies in assisting enforcement.37 For example, some
European and Far East countries consider tipping to be proper
guardianship of a client's interests.38 In fact, tipping is often regarded
as a social duty expected of relatives and friends.39 Although the
trend over the past decade has been toward the illegalization of
tipping, foreign agencies still may reflect a benign reluctance to aid
foreign regulators in their preliminary investigations into such matters. 40
Second, the authority and jurisdiction of the cooperating foreign
agency may also limit effective enforcement. For example, in France
the Commission des Operationsde Bourse4l (Commission) is authorized to conduct securities investigations with an emphasis on protec42
tion of investors and the operational aspects of the French markets.
A specific exception allows the Commission to assist foreign investigative agencies with respect to information already in the possession
of the Commission,43 but only where there is an agreement with the
foreign agency (e.g., the SEC) guaranteeing reciprocity and secrecy."
Nevertheless, the exception is limited to information already in the
hands of the Commission. Thus, investigation into undiscovered
infohnation is not subject to authorized assistance. This authority is
further limited to companies who list their securities on the French
bourse or over-the-counter exchanges.4 5 Investigation of involvement
of securities violations by unlisted subsidiaries may be problematic
for the Commission in aiding foreign regulators in making their own
inquiries.
In many countries, inquiry is cut short when the controlling agency
determines that preliminary investigation is not warranted and there37. Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities
Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 375, 390-91 (1987) [hereinafter Pitt].
38. Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 SrAN. L. Rnv. 857, 860
n.16 (1983). -

-'-

39. Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American CorporationLaw and Securities Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. Rsv. 757, 762 (1982).

40.

Carlton & Fischel, supra note 38, at 860 n.16.

41.

The Commission des Oprations de Bourse was created by Ordinance No. 67-833

instituant une commission des operations de bourse et relative 4lPinformation des porteurs de
valeurs mobilires et i la publicit de certaines operations de bourse, reprinted in BordeauxGroult, Problems of Enforcement and Cooperation in the MultinationalSecurities Market: A
French Perspective, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 453, 455 n.9 (1987).
42. Bordeaux-Groult, supra note 41, at 455.
43. Id. at 453.
44. Id. at 460.
45. Id.
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fore refuses assistance where formal judicial proceedings have not
been initiated. This can create a formidable "Catch-22"

in that

preliminary investigation is necessary to determine whether formal
proceedings should in fact be pursued. 6
Third, blocking statutes may preclude enforcement. 47 For example,
in France, brokers are subject to professional secrecy statutes48 which
prohibit the release of information related to client trading. Although
the definition of what information is to be held in confidence is
often difficult to determine, generally, any information that is not
49
available in the public domain is considered secret.

Thus, while a court may have the power to hear a case and render

a decision, that power is limited by two significant considerations:
customary international law and the ability of regulatory agencies to
effectively enforce domestic regulations implicated by international
transactions.
V.

STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON JUIUSDICTION TO PRESCRIBE

Bringing -an action in a U.S. court first requires that the court
have personal jurisdiction over the parties. 50 However, the focus of
this comment is on subject matter jurisdiction 5' and personal jurisdiction is assumed.

46. Charter & Beck, supranote 11, at 470.
47. For a more detailed discussion of blocking statutes and retaliatory legislation see infra
notes 118 to 125 and accompanying text.
48. Code Pdnal [C. pENr.] art. 378 (Fr.), reprinted in Bordeaux-Groult, supra note 41, at
455 n.9.
49. Bordeaux-Groult, supra note 41, at 461.
50. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); Asahi Metal Ind. Co.,
Ltd. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). Personal jurisdiction is established through
certain minimum contacts that the defendant has with the forum state. Minimum contacts
have been held sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction where the defendant purposefully
avails himself of the privilege of conducting business within the forum state or where the
defendant places its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased by consumers in the forum state. Once the requirements of personal jurisdiction
have been met, the court can then move to critical issues concerning jurisdiction to prescribe.
Although In Personam jurisdiction is a critical element to be established in any litigation
brought in the United States, this article assumes that such standards would be met. The
recent decision of Asahi, contains a lengthy discussion of foreign corporate contact with the
United States relative to the stream of commerce standards used in establishing In Personam
jurisdiction. An analysis of this issue might involve a myriad of problems associated with
multinational offerings or activity associated with international trading that is beyond the scope
of this article.
51. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases
of the general nature or subject being presented to the court. Standard Oil Co. v. Montecatini
Edison, 342 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D. Del. 1972).
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The Securities Act of 1933 (S.A.) and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (S.E.A.) provide the initial basis for subject matter jurisdiction. However, even though securities regulations grant fairly broad
jurisdiction, they do not give specific authority to American federal
courts to apply. United States securities regulations to claims arising
2
from extraterritorial transactions.
Title 15, section 78aa (S.E.A.) establishes exclusive jurisdiction
over violations of the S.E.A. in the federal courts. Title 15, section
78aa provides in relevant part as follow's:
The [federal] district courts... and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or
the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this title or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal
proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action
to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules and
regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such title or
rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the
district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or
transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any
other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever
the defendant may be found. 53
However, section 78dd of Title 15 states that the provisions of the
Act and the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC do not
apply to any person who transacts business in securities5 4 outside the
jurisdiction of the United States unless the activity violates rules and
regulations of the SEC that are enacted specifically to protect the

52. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Congress
granted United States District Courts jurisdiction over violations of the Securities Act of 1933.
15 U.S.C. § 77v (1933). A plaintiff can bring an action in the district where the defendant is
found, where the defendant is an inhabitant, where the defendant transacts business, or where
the offer or sale took place. Id. The fact that the buyers of the securities were residents of a
foreign country at the time of purchase does not necessarily preclude the district court from
exercising jurisdiction under the Securities Act. Ferland v. Orange Groves of Florida, Inc.,
377 F. Supp. 690, 703 (D. Fla. 1974).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1933). Although undecided, a stream of commerce analysis may
assist a court to determine whether a litigant transacted business within the meaning of 15
U.S.C. § 78aa. An in depth study of this question is, however, beyond the scope of this
article.
54. In Zoelsch the district court noted that AA-USA did not "transact business in
securities." This begs the question of the meaning of the phrase "transacting business in
securities" for the purposes of enforcement. It would seem that prospectus preparation might
fall somewhere on the fringe of the definition.
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integrity of market regulations in general. Title 15, section 78dd
provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer, directly or
indirectly, to make use of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of effecting on an
exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, any transaction in any security the issuer of which is a
resident of, or is organized under the laws of, or has its principle
place of business in a place within or subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors or to prevent the'
evasion of this title. (b) The provisions of this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the
United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this title (emphasis

added).
The apparent focus of this section is to exempt foreign brokers,
dealers or investors who trade securities of U.S. based corporations
on foreign markets. In subsection (a) the language of the statute is
clearly directed to transactions involving U.S. based issuers on foreign
exchanges. Subsection (b) specifically applies an exemption to such
activity on foreign markets. The plain meaning of the statute providing for the exemption is further supported by the courts in drawing
the conclusion that concern over foreign transactions should be
limited to those that in some way harm American investors. 55 Thus,
in the absence of provisions that would extend the reach of SEC
regulations, United States courts have consistently applied section
78dd as an exemption of foreign activity from United States jurisdiction. If then, on the face of sections 78aa and 78dd, the Act
precludes extraterritorial jurisdiction, how do United States courts
find jurisdiction behind this statutory language?
United States courts have found that the exclusion of jurisdiction
under section 78dd(b) is not a protective shield for foreign transactions that in some way extend to this country. 5 What appears on its
face to be a total statutory preemption from extraterritorial jurisdic-

55. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32.
56. UFITEC, S.A. v. Carter, 20 Cal. 3d 238 (1977).

317 '
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tion is in reality a very narrow exemption. 57 Thus, judicial interpretation in the United States of section 78dd, coupled with international
trends toward less reserved principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
shifted the focus of jurisdiction to more practical tests.
VI.

A.

CURRENT STANDARDS OF JURISDICTION TO PREscrIBE

JudicialInterpretation of Title 15 section 78dd

As noted above, section 78dd exempts foreign activity, to some
degree, from regulation by the United States under the S.E.A. In a
recent opinion Judge Bork closely scrutinized section 78dd and the
congressional intent behind the S.E.A. 58 finding that the S.E.A. had
as its primary purpose the protection of American investors and
markets. 59 Moreover, Judge Bork said that there was a clear implication that Congress was concerned with extraterritorial transactions
only if they were part of a design to harm American investors or
markets. In Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,6° an action was
brought by West German investors in U.S. federal district court
(District of Columbia) against Arthur Anderson & Co., an Illinois
corporation (AA-USA) based on claims that AA-USA provided information to its affiliate, Arthur Anderson & Co., GmbH (GmbH),
a West German limited liability corporation, who in turn incorporated
that information (either directly or indirectly) in a prospectus. The
court held that the conduct by AA-USA did not constitute transacting
business in securities, nor was it designed to harm American investors.
The court emphasized that when the S.E.A. was enacted fifty years
ago, Congress did not anticipate the complexity of transnational
securities transactions. Thus, the Zoelsch court recognized that it was
in the peculiar position of attempting to identify a "purely hypothetical legislative intent" 61 behind section 78dd.

57. Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); cf. Gurley .v.Documation, Inc., 674 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1982).

58. Unless Congress manifests a contrary intent, federal legislation applies only to activities
that take place within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at
31. The court based its construction on the premise that Congress is primarily concerned with
domestic conditions. Id.
59. Id. See also H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-16 (1934); S. REp. No. 792,
73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-13 (1934).

60. 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
61. The Zoelsch court identified an evolution of cases which interpreted § 78dd. According
to the Court, these cases significantly altered the application of the § 78dd exemption because
they applied more recent concepts of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Zoesch, 824 F.2d at 30.
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The Court determined that Congress would not have intended that
U.S. courts and agencies be devoted to predominantly foreign transactions rather than leaving those concerns to the country in which
the transaction occurred. 62 However, United States federal courts
have considered the section 78dd exemption in a number of contexts
and have permitted the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdictions where
significant conduct64 occurs in the United States or where substantial
effects of foreign activity are felt in the United States. 6
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States

B.

1.

The Conduct and Effects Tests

Given the limitations of international law and the ability to enforce
a law with extraterritorial application, two approaches were developed
to be applied either concurrently or alternatively which expanded
jurisdictional reach. The first is a "subjective territorial principle"
where jurisdiction may be exercised over actions which occur, or
may be related to conduct, within U.S. boundaries (i.e., the "conduct
test"). The second, an "objective territorial principle," extended
jurisdiction to conduct which occurs outside U.S. territorial linits
but which had some impact within the U.S. (i.e., the "effects test"). 6
These two models permit the exercise of jurisdiction over transactions
that could not previously have been reached.
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States section 17,67 (Restatement (Second) or Restatement) extends

62. Id. The conflict only arises when the conduct occurs outside of the United States but
has some effect within the United States. Id. Thus, an action that did not meet the "conduct
test" could still meet the "effects test." rd.
63. UFITEC, S.A. v. Carter, 20 Cal. 3d 238 (1977).
64. See United States v. Weisscredit Banca Com. E D'Invest, 325 F. Supp. 1384, 139293 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 357-58 (9th Cir.
1973); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-37 (2nd
Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207-09 (2nd Cir. 1968). Note, however,
that courts have expanded jurisdiction by applying the "conduct" and "effects" tests recently
included within the provisions of the RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) op FoamaN RELAMTONS LAW OF
mAF
RESTATEmmNT SEcoND]. See infra notes 81-87 and accomTE UNrrED STATEs [Hmmm
panying text.
65. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2nd Cir. 1968); Des Brisay v.
Goldfild Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
66. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
67. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) § 17 provides the framework for what is commonly referred
to as the "conduct test." The American Law Institute has now encompassed this test in § 402
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jurisdiction to include acts or omissions which occur within a territory's boundaries, even though the effect of the conduct may only
be felt outside the territory. 68 For example, in Leasco DataProcessing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,69 the Second Circuit held that jurisdiction was proper over foreign transactions where fraudulent misrepresentations were made in the United States, inducing United
States citizens to invest in securities offered by a British company
on the London Stock Exchange.7 0 The courts were also willing to
adapt the conduct test to cases in which the plaintiffs were foreign
nationals, 71 placing no importance on the fact that damages were
wholly independent of U.S. interests. 72
The second arm of expansion came about with the "effects test"
of section 18 of the Restatement (Second).7 3 Courts have interpreted
the effects-test broadly, reaching the constitutional limits of federal

of the revised Restatement. This section identifies a state's power to promulgate laws which
regulate conduct so long as a substantial part of the conduct takes place within its territory.
REsTATEmENT (Ramvss), supra note 31, § 402 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1985). Section 18 of the
REsrATEMENT (SECoND) provides the framework for what is commonly known as the "effects
test." The sTATmmNT (Ramvss)
contains this test in § 402. This section provides that a
state has the jurisdiction to control conduct that occurs outside of its territory which has, or
is intended to have, substantial effects within its territory. Id.
68. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 469 F.2d 1326, 1326. See also
Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.Pa. 1974); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389
F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Although the courts generally accept the principle behind the conduct test, the courts have
not consistently applied it. Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1310, 1315, n.28 (1985).
69. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1330-33. It is interesting to note a significant demarcation from
the accepted principle of international law that a state is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over
any conduct of its own nationals, even if the conduct occurs outside of its territory. The court
partiilly determines the bases of jurisdiction on a finding of an entity's nationality. United
States courts have freely asserted jurisdiction over multi-national entities based on agency
doctrines, piercing the corporate veil, and other parent/subsidiary considerations. Note, supra
note 68, at 1316-18.
71. Continental Grain (Australia) Partnership Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
417-22 (8th Cir. 1979). See also SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied.,
431 U.S. 938 (1977).
72. See Zoesch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Zoelsch, the D.C. Circuit was
confronted with the issue of domestic conduct resulting in effects not felt in the United States.
Zoesch, 824 F.2d at 29. Although Zoelsch was not decided exclusively on this issue (the case
turned on whether the conduct was substantial and whether it directly caused the harm suffered
by the foreign nationals), the court seems to rationalize foreign effects as a proper basis of
jurisdiction if the domestic conduct is substantial and causes harm abroad. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d
at 33. See also lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 920-21 (2nd Cir. 1980); cf. lIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2nd Cir. 1975); Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326.
73. Although the effects test is derived from jurisdiction based on territoriality, it is
increasingly recognized as a separate and distinct doctrine. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
67, § 402 comment d (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1985).
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.jurisdiction. 74 Under this test, conduct within U.S. territory is not
necessary if a court bases subject matter jurisdiction on a direct and

substantiaP5 effect on domestic markets or investors. 76 In the area of
economic regulation, where Congress is primarily concerned with
domestic affairs, the presumption against extraterritorial application
is strong. 77 However, courts have rebutted that presumption so as to
permit the exercise of jurisdiction where there are allegations that
the extraterritorial conduct produced domestic impact. 78
Controversy concerning the effects test commonly arises from
application of the test to conduct that has some economic effect in
the U.S. but which is lawful in the territory in which it occurs.7 9 The
drafters of Council Draft No. 7 of the Restatement defend the test
by claiming that jurisdiction based on the effect of the challenged
activity has been increasingly accepted, particularly in the European
Community, in connection with regulation of restrictive business
practices. 80
2. Application of The Conduct and Effects Tests
Several approaches have been used by the circuit courts in applying
these jurisdictional tests to actions concerning conduct that is minimally a part of securities violations perpetrdted primarily abroad.
The result seems to be that, depending on which circuit the action
happens to lie, any significant domestic activity, no matter how
remotely connected to the primary transaction, can provide the basis
of U. S. jurisdiction over the domestic actor if the conduct furthers

74. Kestenbaum, Antitrust's "Extraterritorial" Jurisdiction:A Progress Report on the
Balancing of Interests Test, 18 STAN. J. INr'L L. 311, 312 (1982).
75. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d at 1017 (citing RESTATEM-NT (SEcoND), supra note 67,

§ 18(bxi)).
76. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30. See also Shoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir.
1968); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. .446 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
77. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).78. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977) (citing
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)); See also Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.Pa. 1975);
Schoenbaum, 465 F.2d at 220.
79. Kasser 548 F.2d at 116. A rare controversy arises .when effecis are intended to
encroach upon United States' interests but never do so. The Restdtement view is that "when
the intent of the persons sought to be charged is clear and the effect to be produced by the
challenged activity is substantial and foreseeable, the fact that an act or conspiracy was
thwarted before its effect was felt does not deprive the target state of jurisdiction to apply its
law to that activity."
80. RESTATamENT (SEcoND), supra note 64, Council Draft No. 7, reporter's note 2. See
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission (the Dyestuffs case), 11 Common Mkt. L.R.
557 (Ct. of Justice 1972).
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a fraudulent scheme. 8' The Second2 and D.C.83 Circuits are the most
restrictive, declining jurisdiction over domestic conduct that is "merely
preparatory." The current standard in these circuits is that jurisdiction will lie only if the domestic conduct comprises all the elements
of a defendant's conduct necessary to establish a violation of SEC
regulations. Thus, in an action brought based on a violation of Rule
lOb-5, a court must establish that the fraudulent statements or
misrepresentations originated in the U.S., were made with scienter
and in connection with the sale or purchase of securities, and caused
the harm to those defrauded, even though the actual reliance and
damages may occur elsewhere.84
The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have relaxed the standard.
The Third Circuit appears to be the most lenient, exercising jurisdiction where "at least some activity" involved in a fraudulent scheme
occurs within this country. 5s The Eighth Circuit specifically rejected
the Second Circuit's analysis "in favor of a test that would allow
jurisdiction if the domestic conduct was significantly in furtherance
of a fraudulent scheme. 8 The Ninth Circuit is the middle ground
between the approach of the Second and Eighth Circuits. 7 As a
result of the differing approaches, there has been a loosening of the
jurisdictional requirements.
3.

Section 403-The Balancing Test

The most recent development in extra-territorial jurisdiction is the
balancing of interests test of the latest revisions of the Restatement.88
Traditional bases of jurisdiction are still effective 9 but the application
of extraterritorial jurisdiction is further expanded. The drafters of
the Restatement, recognizing the increasing magnitude of hostility on

81. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30-31; Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 547 F. Supp.
309 (N.D.I1. 1982); Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F.Supp. 477 (D.Del.

1986).
82. Bersch, 389 F. Supp. at 446; lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); IIT,
an Intern. Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); AVC Nederland B.V. v.
Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
83. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 33; Laker Airways v. Sabena Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d
909 (3d Cir. 1984).
84. Id.
85. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114.
86. Continental Grain (Australia), 592 F.2d at 418-20.
87. Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1983).

88. RmSTATEmmNT (SEcoND), supra note 64.
89. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
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the part of foreign governments and their courts, 9° developed the
balancing test as an answer to international outcry. 9'
This test, as outlined in section 403 of the Restatement 92 predicates
the exercise of jurisdiction on reasonableness. 93 Therefore, even where
the traditional bases of jurisdiction are met under section 402 (i.e.,
conduct and effects tests), jurisdiction may not be exercised if to do
so would be unreasonable.9 4 In determining whether the exercise of
jurisdiction would be reasonable, various factors are considered including (a) the conduct and effects tests, (b) connections, residence,
or economfc activity between the state and the parties, (c) the
character of the regulated activity, (d)justified 6xpectations that
might be protected or hurt by the regulation in question, (e) international political, legal, or economic factors, (f) consistency with the

traditions of the international system, (g) the extent another state
has an interest in regulating the activity, and (h) the likelihood of
conflict with regulation by other states. 95 In essence, the reasonable-

90. RESTATEmmNT (SncoND), supra note 64, § 403, reporter's notes at 7. "Some states,
particularly the United Kingdom, have questioned various applications of U.S. law as 'exorbitant."' Id. See also Debates on the British Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents
Bill, 698 PAEL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.)"1215-83 (1964); Debates on the British Protection of
Trading Interests Act 973 PArL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1535 (1979).
91. The drafters intended courts to apply this test as a limiting principle. RESTATEmENT
(SEcoND), supra note 64, § 403 reporter's note 2, at 8.Limiting U.S. Jurisdiction Under
Principle of Reasonableness, at 8. In effect, however, this test has become an expansionary
tool. Strong arguments have been made that balancing tests are not compatible with the
principle of "comity among nations" because, in effect, they tend to de-emphasize foreign
sovereign interests and almost never lead a court to decline jurisdiction. Zoesch, 824 F.2d at
32, n.2. See also Note, supra note 68, at 1323-25. Thus, what was intended to be a jurisdictional
restraint has fostered an extraordinary lack of restraint by United States courts. Id.
92. RESTATEmENT (REVSED), supra note 31.
93. Courts derived the reasonableness test from §§ 7, 17, 18 and 40 of the previous
Restatement. The development of the reasonableness standard is understood "not as a basis
for requiring that states consider moderating their enforcement of laws which they are
authorized to prescribe, but as an essential element in determining whether, as a matter of
international law, the state has jurisdiction to prescribe." RESTATEm Nr (REvsn), supra note
31, § 403 reporter's note 10.
94. Id. § 403(1).
95. Id. § 403(2). Section 403 provides as follows:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to the activities, relations,
status, or interests of persons or things having connections with another state or
states when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or unreasonable is judged
by evaluating all the relevant factors, including, where appropriate,

(a) the extent to which the activity
(i) takes place within the regulating state; or
(ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b)the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
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ness standard is a balancing test. 96 The balancing test is used in a

generic sense to accommodate foreign interests.9 In applying these
Restatement factors to assess foreign interests, a U.S. court may take
into account interests expressed by foreign governments, whether
made through diplomatic channels, a brief amicus curiae, or by
governmental declarations through parliamentary or political debates,

press conferences or communiqu&s. 98 Similarly, the courts may consider declarations of U.S. interest expressed by the Executive Branch
and its agencies.9

4. Section 416-The Link Between section 403 and Securities
Regulation'0
Section 416 of the Restatement extends further the jurisdictional

standards of section 403 in applying U.S. securities regulations.' 01

regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,
or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation in question;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international political, legal
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
Id. § 403.
96. Zoelsch, 825 F.2d at 32 n.2.
97. Kestenbaum, supra note 74, at 311.
98. RESrATEmENT (SEcoND), supra note 64, reporter's note 6, at II.
99. Id. For example, a U.S. court may consider whether the United States Department
of Justice declined to prosecute an action based on potential adverse effects on foreign relations
between the countries involved.
100. Additionally, § 418 of the Restatement addresses the propriety of the exercise of
jursidiction over multinational entities on the basis of ownership and affiliation. Specific
incidents of limited jurisdiction are outlined that allow, by direction through the parent entity,
regulation of accounting, disclosure requirements, and tax regulations. Although general
jurisdiction is not authorized soley on the basis of affiliation, jurisdiction may properly be
exercised over foreign subsidiaries if the activity fits into the framework outlined in §§ 402
and 403 of the Restatement. REsTATEmENT (REsVIED), supra note 31, Vol. 2, Part IV.
101. R Amai-TE (REmsE), supra note 31, § 416 provides as follows:
Jurisdiction to Regulate Activities Related to Securities: Law of the United States.
(1) The United States generally has jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to
(a) 1)any transaction in securities in the United States to which a national or resident
of the United States is a party, and
ii) any offer to enter into a securities transaction, made in the United States by or
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Section 416 of the Restatement incorporates both the conduct and
the effects tests as well as the balancing test. The primary focus of
this section is the protection of U.S. investors, U.S. securities markefs, and those who trade on those markets.102 The reasonableness
of exercising jurisdiction depends to a great extent on the character
of the activity to be regulated.103 For example, section 416 allows
U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over conduct of a conspiratorial
nature even though the conspirators never accomplished the transaction.104

to a national or resident of the United States;
(b) any transaction in securities
i) carried out, or intended to be carried out, on an organized securities market in
the United States, or
ii) carried out, or intended to be carried out, predominantly in the United States,.
although not on an organized securities market;
(c)conduct, regardless of where it occurs, significantly related to a transaction
described in Subsection l(b), if the conduct has, or is intended to have, a substantial
effect in the United States;
(d)conduct occurring predominantly in the United States that is related to a
transaction in securities, even if the transaction occurs outside the United States;
and
(e)
investment advice or solicitation of proxies or of consents with respect to securities,
carried out predominantly in the United States.
(2)The jurisdiction of the United States to apply its securities laws to transactions
or conduct other than those addressed in Subsection (I)depends on whether it is
reasonable to do so in the light of § 403, giving particular weight to
(a)whether the transaction or conduct has, or can reasonably be expected to have,
a substantial effect on a securities market in the United States for securities of the
same issuer or on holdings in such securities by United States nationals or residents;
(b)whether representations are made or negotiations are conducted in the United
States; and
(c)whether the party sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the United States
is a United States national or residint, or the persons sought to be protected are
United States nationals or residents.
Id. § 416.
102. RsATmENT (SEcoND),supra note 64, § 416, comment a at 16.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id. It is interesting to note also that RnsTATEIA NT C(Rvi ), supra note 31, § 418
CTent. Final Draft 1985) sets forth provisions for jurisdiction with respect to activities of
foreign subsidiaries. Under that section, subject to § 403, a state may have the power to
exercise "limited" jurisdiction with respect to foreign branches of corporations organized
under the laws of the state exercising such jurisdiction. However, jurisdiction may not ordinarily
be exercised with respect to activities of corporations organized under the laws of a foreign
state solely on the basis that they are owned or controlled by nationals of the state exercising
jurisdiction. Moreover, the "reasonable" standards of § 403 incorporate additional factors
found in § 418 with respect to activities of foreign entities. Those factors include:
activities of foreign entities
(a)by direction to the parent corporation in respect of such matters as uniform
accounting, disclosure to investors, or preparation of consolidated tax returns of
multinational enterprises; or
Cb) by direction to the parent or the subsidiary in other exceptional cases, depending
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VII. APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING MODEL
A.

Viability of Balancing Interests

In Zoelsch Judge Bork criticized the balancing test for several
reasons. 0 5 First he pointed out that application of balancing tests in
antitrust litigation was unsuccessful because they were unpredictable

and difficult to apply.1° 6 Although courts and commentators have
argued that the balancing test, being both flexible and sophisticated, 07
enables the courts to consider a range of foreign interests and policies
without being limited to specifically recognized immunities or defenses, 10 the balancing test has been found unworkable due to the
impossibility of balancing totally contradictory and mutually negating

interests.' o9
One of the major decisions scrutinizing the use of a balancing test
in antitrust actions was Timberlane Lbr. Co. v. Bank of America,
N.T. & S.A. 0 wherein the court stated that a judicially objective
standard of comity should be applied as a matter of law, not merely

as a matter of discretion."' The balancing test has also been criticized
abroad on the grounds that such a test is an extremely difficult
standard to apply; that comity is too uncertain in origin, content,
and method of application to be relied upon; and that the courts
simply cannot feasibly apply judicial techniques to balance the dis-

on all relevant factors, including:
(i) whether the regulation is essential to implementation of a program to further a
major, urgent national interest of the state exercising jurisdiction;
(ii) whether the national program of which the regulation is a part cannot be carried
out effectively unless it is applied also to foreign subsidiaries;
(iii) whether the regulation is in potential or actual conflict with the law or policy
of the state where the subsidiary is established; and
(c) in the exceptional cases referred to in paragraph (b), the burden of establishing
reasonableness is heavier when the direction is issued to the foreign subsidiary than
when issued to the parent corporation.
Id.
105.

Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
III.
(CCH)

Id. at 32, n.2.
Id. at 32.
Kestenbaum, supra note 74, at 334.
In re: Uranium Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Il. 1979).
549 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id. See also SHmouLD, ExRa'anmuuro-xuY AND ANTITRusT, 5 TRAE REo. REP.
50,386 and 55,857.
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parate interests of national importance of two states."n
B.

The Impact of Retaliatory Legislation: The Realism of
International Tension

Whatever authority may be vested in the United States Congress
to pass laws or regulations having extraterritorial effect is limited by
the court's ability to enforce such measures. If foreign sovereigns
refuse to recognize the propriety of a law or regulation and thereby
refuse to permit enforcement, the validity of the regulation is seriously
questioned. In the area of antitrust law, U.S. extraterritorial enforce3
ment has given rise to intense international antipathy."
In the wake of In re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation,114 a letter was
issued by the U.S. State Department to the Seventh Circuit and the
District Court stating that the court had caused serious embarrassment to the United States in its relations with its allies." 5 The court
was criticized for its unwillingness to apply reasonable standards in
exercising jurisdiction, which, coupled with offensive remarks as to
foreign government involvement in the case, created a dramatic
potential for international confrontation." 6
For instance, in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries
Limited,17 the English Court of Appeal granted an injunction preventing a party to litigation in the United States from obeying an
order of the U.S. District Court of New York. A more dramatic and
universal response to overreaching jurisdiction in general came in the
form of the so-called blocking statutes. Although to some extent the
tension was relieved by the ratification of the Hague Convention of

112. Case and Comment, Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 (United Kingdom),
40 C .apmrm L.J. 41, 42 (1981); Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 75 Am. J.
Irr'L. L. 257, 268-69, 281 (1981).
113. Foreign nations concerned with the extraterritorial reach of antitrust regulation have
sometimes resented and protested broad assertion of jurisdiction by U.S. courts. Timberlane
Lmbr. Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d at 609. It is interesting to note that
up to May 1973, the U.S. Dept. of Justice filed nearly 250 foreign trade antitrust cases, all
of which were found to have proper jurisdiction. Id. at 608, n.12.
114. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. II. 1979).
115. Kestenbaum, supra note 74, at 323.
116. Id. Similarly, in OPEC cases, injunctive relief held the possibility of insult to the
OPEC states adding international tension. Id. at 329, n.91.
117. 100 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See Pettit & Styles, The InternationalResponse to
the ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. L. 697, 698 (1982).
However, a greater concern hence is the enforcement of investigatory and regulatory powers
by administrative agencies in the U.S. such as the SEC. See notes 37 - 49 and accompanying
text (regarding the power and authority of the SEC to investigate abroad).
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1968,118 the saga of tension continued with the passage of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 by the United Kingdom as a
direct response to U.S. long-arm jurisdiction representing the high

water mark of jurisdictional protectionism." 9 Diplomatic response
from the U.S. concerning the legislation was a request that Parliament
should recognize that the bill would encourage confrontational rather
than cooperative approaches to resolving these issues of mutual
interest.120
Canadian response to excessive jurisdictional reach was similar to

that of the United Kingdom. In 1976 Canada amended the Combines
Investigation Act of 1923 to grant powers to the Restrictive Trade

Practices Commission to direct Canadian citizens to disregard certain
foreign laws and judgments. 121 In explaining the need for such
legislation, Justice Minister Chretien commented that Canada felt
that it was improper for a country to attempt to extend its jurisdiction
to lawful activities that occur outside its territory.1'2
In Australia, under the authority of the Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976, the Attorney-General has
extensive powers to control the production of documents or oral

evidence if it is found that the exercise of foreign jurisdiction would

118. The purpose of the Convention is "to facilitate the transmission and execution of
letters of request [re: evidentiary matters] and to further the accommodation of the different
methods which they use for this purpose and to improve mutual judicial recognition in civil
or commercial matters." Hague Evidence Convention, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231. In ratifying the Convention, the United Kingdom
declared pursuant to Article 23, that it would not execute letters of request issued for the
purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents. Following the Hague Convention, the
United Kingdom passed the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, which
placed procedural restrictions and limitations on obtaining pre-trial discovery. In practice, the
English courts attempted to give effect to requests for evidence sought by foreign courts. Pettit
& Styles, supra note 110, at 700-01. In 1978, Lord Denning M.R. allowed discovery through
letters rogatory in the first published opinion following the Evidence Act of 1975. In that
opinion Lord Denning stated that "It is our duty and our pleasure to do all we can to assist
that court, just as we would expect the United States court to assist us in like circumstances."
rd. (citing In Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract, M.D.L. Docket No.
235 [1977] 3 All. E.R.- 703, 708, revsd. sub. nom. RTZ v. Westinghouse, [1978] 1 All. E.R.
434). However, on appeal the House of Lords observed that what may be the policy of one
state to defend may be the policy of another state to attack. rd. In response to that observation,
the (then) Assistant U.S. Attorney General J. Shenfield stated that "those who preach comity
should practice it.... We understand that comity is a two way street." Address to ABA
Section of International Law, August 9, 1978, reprinted in Extraterritorial Impact of U.S.
Antitrust Laws, Trade Reg. Rep., Transfer Binder (CCH) 50,386 [hereinafter Shenfield].
119. Shenfield, supra note 118.
120. Shenfield, supra note 118, at 50,386 n.19; Pettit & Styles, supra note 117, at 70206; See also Rosen, The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 15 INT'L LAw. 213 (1981).
121. Pettit & Styles, supra note 117, at 707.
122. Id. at 708.
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be inconsistent with international law or comity, or if denial of such
evidence would be in keeping with national interests. 12 This international stigma is also evidenced by legislation in the Netherlands,
Italy, Germany, France, Belgium,'1" and South Africa. 125
Commentators have also argued that the "reasonableness" standards incorporated in the balancing test have relieved international
tension to some degree. Decisions utilizing the reasonableness
standard 26 were greeted as heralding an era of international
understanding'27 and remedied some of the earlier international tension. However, the tension has not dissolved. If the intent of jurisdictional models was to gain acceptance and cooperation in regulation,
it is apparent that this goal has not been achieved with the balancing
test. Additionally, a lack of, consensus and doubts about the factors
of the balancing test raise questions about the consistency to be
expected in future decision-making.'2
C. Can the Balancing Test Survive ConstitutionalScrutiny?
A more complex question arising from application of the balancing
test is how the separation of powers provisions of the Constitution
of the United States may limit the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Fundamentally, the U.S. Constitution distinctly separates the
branches of government by delegating the power to enact laws' to
Congress, the afithority" in diplomacy and foreign relations to the
Executive branch, and the authority to interpret the laws enacted by
Congress to the federal judiciary. Within this framework the judiciary
is precluded from deciding questions that are political rather than

legal.
The scope of this constitutional preclusion, commonly referred to
as the "political question" doctrine, may from time to time extend
to the outer limits of international law. The United States Supreme"
Court has observed that there are sweeping statements that all questions touching foreign relations are political questions.12 9 However,

123. Id. at 709; see also Lacey, Act of State and ExtraterritorialReach: Problems of Law
and Policy, A.B.A. SEC. oF INT'L L. & PRACTiCE (1983).
124. Pettit & Styles, supra note 117, at 709.
125. Id. at 711-14.
126. Timberlane Lmbr. Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d at 612, n.25;
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum C6rp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3rd Cir. 1979).
127. Kestenbaum, supra note 74, at 319.
128. Id. at 333, 336.
129. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
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notwithstanding that issues relating to foreign relations often rest on
standards that defy judicial application or involve the exercise of
discretion reserved solely to the executive or legislative branches, 3 0
these issues are not inherently outside the jurisdiction of the courts. 31
In applying standards of justiciable determination to the authority
of the United States Congress to prescribe securities regulations with
extraterritorial effect, it is difficult at best to determine whether that
power vested in Congress to make laws that necessarily involve
international policy fall within or without the jurisdiction of United
States courts.
The factors of the Restatement balancing test, particularly those
requiring the balancing of national interests, implicate the political
question doctrine directly. Judge Bork implies in Zoelsch that it is
improper placement of authority for the judiciary to decide questions
of foreign policy as required by the balancing test. 3 Although one
may argue that the test merely requires judicial interpretation of
factual settings, one may also argue that due to the very nature of
the factors, 33 application would be violative of the Constitution
because the process is, in fact, a political interest determination, and
hence a political question. 34 Thus, the factors comprising the Restatement test may transform a normally justiciable action into a
political question.
In Baker v. Carr,35 six factors were outlined for use in determining
whether the question is political. The Baker factors were consolidated

130. Id.
131. In considering whether a dispute is within the framework of the political question
doctiine, barring review by the courts, the question of justiciability might be resolved by
determining whether the effect of the action in controversy is completely external to the United

States. If so the action would fall squarely within the category of foreign affairs. United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Further, justiciability determinations

have been made on the basis of whether there is a discoverable and manageable standard upon
which the court can resolve the dispute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
132.

Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

133. RrAT-mENT (REVISED), supra note 31, § 403.
134. Some judges regard international law as inherently political. However, this view fails
to recognize the importance of international legal norms and processes. Gordon, American
Courts, InternationalLaw and "PoliticalQuestions" Which Touch ForeignRelations, 14 INr'L
LAw. 297, 310 (1980). Moreover, it would be error to suppose that every case or controversy

touching foreign relations is beyond judicial review. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211. For
example, the courts are not prevented by the political question doctrine from hearing cases
that involve treaties, admiralty, or the status of aliens. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. at 208-26.

135. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. The six factors outlined in Baker are as follows: (1)
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch or
department of the government, (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standard
for resolving the dispute, (3) the impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy
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in Goldwater v. Carter,136 into three factors: (1) does the issue involve
resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to
a coordinate branch of government? (2) would resolution of the

question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? and (3) do prudential considerations counsel against judicial
37
intervention? Applying these standards to the Restatement factors, it appears
that such issues involving foreign policy require the courts to resolve
conflicts beyond judicial expertise. In Judge Bork's opinion, Congress
should amend laws that either offer no specific criteria for dispute
resolution or loosely set forth criteria that require the balancing of
political interests .13 The responsibility for assessing the wisdom of
policy choices and resolving competing interests does not lie with the
judiciary, 39 rather such responsibility is vested in the political
branches.'14 Further, past foreign reaction strongly counsels against
judicial intervention. Judicial decisions based on policy resulted in
41
retaliation based on policy.
Although, the balancing test enables the courts to consider a wide
variety of foreign interests and policies,' 42 the balancing test has been

determination that is outside the discreti6n of the court, (4) the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect for the coordinate
branches of the government, (5) an unusual need for unquestioned adherence to a previously
decided policy issue, and (6) the potential for embarrassment if the question were answered
by more than one governmental. department. d.
136. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
137. Id.
138. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d at 33.
139. Id. at 33; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
140. Zoesch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d at 33 n.3. For a comparison of
extraterritorial application of laws in Australia, see The ExtraterritorialApplication of the
AustralianAntitrust Law, 13 J. INT'L. L. ECON. 273 (1979); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn
v. A Certain" Cargo, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978). An interesting issue may arise as to the
extent of policy evaluation based on administrative agencies of the federal government. For
example, if the SEC decides to forego prosecution of a particular transaction where private
parties also initiate an action, should the courts give weight to those considerations by the
SEC? Assuming that the Department of State may directly collaborate with and advise the
Department of Justice in relevant foreign policy concerns, "[a] court can feel more comfortable
asserting jurisdiction if it knows that foreign policy concerns can be accommodated by the
plaintiff [i.e. SEC] and are not left entirely to the court's untutored evaluation." Zoesch v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d at 33, n.3.
141. Rosen, The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 15 Ibr'L LAw. 213, 213-14 (1981).
The Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, passed in the United Kingdom was a direct
response to the inability to settle such disputes through diplomatic channels. Pettit & Styles,
supra note 117, at 701.
142. It has been urged that the governments concerned should file amici briefs at the early
stages of litigation to promote the balancing test. Kestenbaum, supra note 74, at 332 n.63,
333 n.64.
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criticized for that very reason. The Attorney General of Australia
has stated that the balancing of national interests is a political
function, not a judicial one. 143
Several courts have admitted that their decisions with regard to
44
transnational securities transactions are based distinctly on policy'
and have offered three justifications for the use of the balancing
test. 4 First, by allowing jurisdiction here, other countries may be
encouraged to take appropriate steps against parties who seek to
perpetrate frauds in the United States. Second, exercise of jurisdiction
will enhance the ability of the SEC to vigorously police the conduct
of those who enter into securities transactions stemming into the
United States. 146 Finally, to deny jurisdiction may invite defiance of
regulation by those who wish to defraud foreign securities purchasers
or sellers by using the United States as a base of operations. In SEC
v. Kasser 47 the court concluded that Congress could not have ina ."Barbary Coast" to harbor
tended the United States to become
48
international securities "pirates.'
However, these rationalizations are criticized by those who believe
that Congress could not have intended jurisdiction to be exercised
on the basis of foreign policy as Congressional concern was only
with United States investors and markets.' 49 When the Securities Act
of '1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were passed,
Congress did not consider the reach of jurisdiction over cases involving predominantly foreign transactions50 since the international
connections in the securities markets were not nearly as extensive nor
as complex as today.15 ' Under the Goldwater political question analysis, the Restatement factors of section 403 that question the importance of a regulation in the international political, legal or economic
system, seem to fall squarely within the domain of the political
question, rendering application of those factors beyond the scope of
the judicial role.

143. Id. at 337.
144. Continental Grain (Australia) Partnership Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
421 (8th Cir. 1979), citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977).
145. Zoesch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d at 32.
146. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116; see also Zoesch 824 F.2d at 32.
147. SEC v. Kasser, 391 F.Supp. 1167 (D.N.J. 1975).
148. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116.

149. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson Co., 824 F.2d at 33.
150. Id. at 30.
151. Judge Bork, addressing the same rationalization, concluded that this rationalization
was in fact sound reasoning why Congress should amend relevant statutes and why the courts

should not do so. Id.
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VIII.

AN ALTERNATIVE MODBL

Recognizing the shortcomings of the balancing test, can those
requirements be discarded? Assuming that the problems inherent in
the balancing test, both realized and potential, warrant a supplantation of some other model, can a model be constructed that coordinates rather than complicates extraterritorial jurisdiction? A greater
emphasis on krinciples of causation would strip away the complications that push courts into areas of foreign policy and political
12
determiiiations better left for the other branches of.government. 1
Causationi, as it may be applied to jurisdictional principles related
to securities regulati6n, evolves primarily from the "in connection
with" provisions of section 10b and Rule l0b-5.-11 In Wessel v.
Buhler 5-4 an accountant prepared financial statements, which a coriioration used in preparing a prospectus. Plaintiffs alleged liability
under Rule 10b-5 on the part of the accountant because, inter alia,
the accountant's financial statemeits were made in connection with
the purchase and sale of securities.155 In rejecting the claim, the court
acknowledged that the "in connection with" requirement has been
broadly construed, but that "its reach is not boundless. " 15 6 In so
ruling, the cduit found that the accountant's, statements were not
publicly disseminated in such a way that would influence potential
investors.'1 Thus, where conduct may be substantial in the overall
scheme of a transaction, if the same conduct did not cause the
58
investors to participate, jurisdiction would seem to be lacking.1
Thus, causation parallels the "in connection with" requirements of
section 10b and Rule 10b-5.15 9
A.

The Two Arenas of Causation

Causation may be divided into two arenas. First, "damages causation" requires that the acts giving rise to the litigation caused the

152. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446; see also SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968), (holding that jurisdiction would lie where the
conduct was calculated to influence the investing public).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158."
159.

See generallyZoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 34-35 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 281.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id. See also Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d at 34-35.
Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d at 34-35.
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harm. Second, "transactional causation" requires that the act actually
induced the investors to take part in the activity. Under this model,
jurisdiction would lie where the conduct was calculated to influence
the investing public. 16°
To illustrate transactional causation, consider two hypothetical
cases. International Property Investments (IPI), is a corporation to
be formed in France to purchase prestigious income producing prop-

erty located in key metropolitan cities around the world such as
Paris, New York, and Tokyo. European Financial Group (EFG), a
partnership organized under the laws of Germany, is targeted by IPI
as a primary source for initial capital. Using capital raised by the
first issuance of stock, IPI will purchase a high rise office complex
located in New York.
Assume that one of the EFG partners is temporarily located in
Washington D.C. for reasons totally unrelated to the transaction in
question. Assume also that promotional presentations were previously
made to all other EFG partners in France and that the absent
partner's vote is necessary to consummate the transaction. Here,
merely as an accommodation to the absent partner, a promotional
presentation is made in Washington D.C. In this scenario the city
where the presentation is made has no significance whatsoever in the
transaction. The conduct (i.e., the promotion) might be regarded as
substantial in the overall scheme of the transaction, later consummated in France, but the connection with the location of the conduct
is insignificant with regard to "transactional causation" in influencing
the investor to decide to participate in the transaction. Here, although
damages causation might be established, i.e., the promotion can be
linked to ultimate losses incurred by EFG, transactional causation is
lacking. Thus, jurisdiction in a U.S. court would be inappropriate
under these circumstances.
On the other hand, if all EFG partners insisted on viewing a
potential property investment of IPI (e.g., the New York high-rise)
and the sales presentation was made at that location and the investment agreement to purchase shares in IPI was consummated in New
York, the outcome would be very different.' 61 In this scenario both

160. Id. at 34.
161. For a parallel to this scenario, see generally Gruenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421
(1983) where the purchase of a foreign corporation was consummated in Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. That meeting was one of several meetings involved in negotiating the
purchase but all other meetings were held in foreign countries, all corporate entities were
foreign, and all parties to the purchase and sale were foreign nationals. The meeting was held
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damages causation and transactional causation could be established,
therefore legitimizing U.S. jurisdiction over the transaction.
This causation model might be viewed most appropriately on a
spectrum ranging from absolute jurisdiction to complete denial of
jurisdiction. At one end of the spectrum, absolute jurisdiction would
be- appropriate where both damages and transactional causation can
be established. At the opposite end of the spectrum, complete denial
of jurisdiction would occur where neither damages nor transactional
causation could be established. Some difficulty may arise in those
cases, as will be discussed, infra, that fall somewhere in the middle
of the spectrum where only damages or transactional causation can
be established. To a great extent, jurisdiction over these transactions
will depend on whether the model is applied narrowly or broadly,
and whether enforcement is pursued by private individuals or a
regulatory agency.
B. Construction of the Causation Model
A fundamental question that must be addressed is whether the
principles of causation should be construed broadly or narrowly. For
example, consider again the earlier hypothetical involving the Japanese Investor who uses inside information and sells all his holdings
in Euromax, the British corporation listing its securities on the
London, Tokyo and New York stock exchanges. This in turn forces
the price down when trading opens in London and New York. British
and U.S. investors in "Euromax incur substantial losses on those
markets because of the dramatic price failure. A suit brought in a
U.S. court against Investor presents difficult questions of whether
U.S. and Bitish investors (or the SEC) can sustain such an action
based on insider trading claims.
If a U.S. investor in Euromax has no knowledge that the price is
falling dramatically and, based on purely personal reasons, sells his
holdings at a lower price than might have been obtained, what effect
would these causation principles have on the domestic investor's
claim? If these causation principles were given broad construction,
it could be argued that damages were incurred by the investor because
of a substantial price drop even though the investor was unaware of
the price drop or the market participation by the Japanese Investor.
in Los Angeles for the convenience of air travel schedules and the intended consummation
was scheduled to be concluded in the Bahamas. Jurisdiction was held to be proper based on
the conduct in Los Angeles even though no effects impacted on U.S. citizens. Id.
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Additionally, since the Investor's participation induced further transactions, i.e., massive share dumping by investors, any claim arising
in connection with Investor's activity would be valid-if broad construction were given. Arguably, broad construction of causation
would be no different from previous models, granting an overreaching
extension of jurisdiction by the courts. Further, such a broad construction would leave the courts with no better definition for application than previous models resulting in the same inconsistency that
has been experienced with balancing tests. Broad construction would
seem to promote bias in favor of unfortunate investors making the
test inherently unfair to defendants.
However, if a narrow construction were applied, the opposite
would result. In the above example, the U.S. investor could not
establish either transactional causation nor damages causation. His
decision to sell his shares were for personal reasons totally unrelated
to Investor's transaction or the subsequent market fluctuations. Similarly, his decision to sell and his resulting losses were in keeping
with the inherent risk involved in market participation. Without
knowledge of Investor's involvement the dramatic price failure did
not, in fact, create his losses. Therefore, under a narrow construction
of causation, no claim could be established. Essentially, narrow
construction would prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction as
an accommodation to an injured party merely for the sake of offering
a remedy that would not otherwise lie.
If these principles of causation are applied narrowly, courts would
not be faced with ambiguous tests, rather application could be
rendered consistently and predictably without bias.
C. SEC Enforcement v. Private Claims
Assuming that narrow construction is appropriate, how might
application be different if an action of enforcement were brought by
the SEC as opposed to a private claim as described above? Bearing
in mind that the interest of the SEC is much broader, i.e., watching
over the interests of all U.S. investors and the integrity of the
markets, causation must be viewed in a different light. When Investor
engaged in activity that is admittedly in violation of SEC regulations,
the SEC's interest hinges on the market impact rather than individual
impact. Here, where transactional causation might be lacking for a
private investor, transactional causation can be established in an
enforcement action by the inducement of investors participating in
trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to sell their
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interests at substantial losses. Such an influence jeopardizes the
stability of the market which the SEC was established to protect.
Additionally, damages causation can be established in the price failure
of related and unrelated stocks traded on the NYSE. Thereafter,
investors may panic, further perpetuating overall catastrophe. As we
have seen, the potential effects arising out of such problems enhance
the interests of world-wide market regulators in combatting "global
effect conduct."
IX.

CONCLUSION

By placing a greater emphasis on causation principles, coupled
with the already existing conduct and effects tests, the need for
balancing foreign policy is eliminated. This proposed "new" territorialism would eliminate the balancing of foreign policy and replace
that test by augmenting the conduct test with principles of causation.
By altering the overall framework of extraterritorial jurisdictional
models; several goals could be reached. First, ,such a test would be
predictable. Causation is a principle that has been universally recognized.'6 When courts apply the conduct test, tempered with causation, few problems of inconsistency would result. To the contrary,
such a standard is consistent with fundamental legal theory in the
form of territorialism in the U.S. and abroad. Judicial authority
would rest upon traditional constitutional conventions of accepted
jurisdictional -limits without usurping Executive and Congressional
territory. Further, tension and conflict between states, caused by
extraterritorial exertion of jurisdiction, would be greatly reduced since
this new territorialism would be more in tune with accepted principles
of other nations.
The effect of the territorialist perspective is that foreign corporations and individuals may predict when U.S. courts will exercise
jurisdiction over foreign transactions. This model provides a neutral,
predictable, and consistent application of jurisdiction over foreign
initiated transactions. Therefore, foreign regulators of securities markets in other countries may be more willing to acknowledge the need
for extraterritorial regulation of securities markets and thus more
actively pursue a cooperative system of regulation. To the extent that

162. See Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities
(the Dyestuffs case), I1 Common Mkt. L.R. 557 (Ct. of Justice 1972); Court of Justice of
the European Communities, Reports of Cases before the Court, 1972, Part II, (Luxembourg)

619, 694.
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the force of technology invites movement toward total globalization
of securities trading, one might venture to explore the possibility of
one world market with many locations around the world, jointly
regulated by member countries. Additionally, this causation model
conforms to the underlying philosophies of the United States Congress exhibited in the provisions of sections 78aa and 78dd of Title
15. Since the original intent behind section 78dd was to exempt
foreign transactions from U.S. jurisdiction unless the transaction
causes harm to U.S. investors or markets, greater emphasis on
causation principles would give added meaning to the conduct and
effects tests in relation to statutory limitations.
A final question remains in assessing how such a model fits into
the underpinnings of traditional territorialism. Causation is distinctly
in conformity with those principles. Principles of causation reaffirm
traditional notions of sovereign power by giving a more coherent
basis of application to models previously established. The reality of
globalization requires the transformation of territorialism from traditional theories of distinct borders to a new territorialism which
incorporates the responsibility of nations to harmonize internal laws
and regulations with other nations to protect common interests.
Surely the current state of internationalization of the securities market
is on the cutting edge of common interests. The various jurisdictional
"parts" form a component system that creates the network for the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The components form a layered system of application, integrating necessary provisions which,
taken as a whole, make the system viable while protecting territorial
independence.
Douglas B. Spoors

